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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2911 
 ___________ 
 
 YONG AI LIU, 
       Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
  Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A200-035-983) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Miriam K. Mills 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 2, 2012 
 
Before: AMBRO, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







 Petitioner, Yong Ai Liu, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(―BIA‖ or ―Board‖) final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 




 Liu is a native and citizen of China.  He entered the United States in 2006 and was 
charged with removability pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) as an alien present without being admitted or paroled.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).   
Liu conceded removability as charged, but sought asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  In his initial I-589 
application, Liu contended that he had experienced past persecution, and feared future 
persecution, due to his practice of Falun Gong.  He claimed that, in June 2005, he had 
been arrested by village cadres, interrogated about his practice, beaten, and ordered to 
inform on the leaders of his group.  Despite the fact that his application clearly stated that 
he was arrested for actually practicing Falun Gong, Liu curiously contended in an 
affidavit attached to the application that he did not practice Falun Gong, only spoke in 
support of it.  (AR 535-36.)  
Liu subsequently filed an amended I-589 in which he claimed for the first time 
that he had been arrested, detained, and tortured for more than a month in January 2005.  
He also claimed for the first time that his mother had been detained and tortured in 1999 
and 2005 for practicing Falun Gong.   
At an August 2007 merits hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Liu 
confusingly testified that he began practicing Falun Gong in 2004 ―[b]ecause he started 
having problem[s] with [his] stomach at [the] beginning of 2006.‖  (AR 435.)  With 
respect to the alleged acts of persecution, Liu explained that, when he was detained in 
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January 2005, the police had punched, kicked, and beaten him with a stick.  He did not 
sustain any injuries, however, because the police ―used a telephone book as a padding 
when they beat [him] . . . [t]hey used a notebook as a padding and cover, too.‖  (AR 432.)  
Liu stated that he was not given any documentation that could confirm his arrest and 
detention.  (AR 433.)  Liu maintained that he had also been detained in June 2005, but 
only for a few hours.  
The IJ concluded that Liu’s testimony lacked credibility and denied his 
applications for relief.  The IJ explained that, ―[b]ased on a variety of [in]consistencies 
which go to the very heart of respondent’s claim, the Court finds the respondent’s claim 
for relief incredulous and likely frivolous with respect to the Falun Gong allegation.‖  
(AR 410.)  Upon review, the BIA remanded the matter to the IJ for further proceedings 
because certain portions of the hearing transcript were missing or indiscernible.   
Following remand, the IJ admitted the transcript from the prior hearing into the 
record and conducted a new hearing.  When asked about the discrepancies between his 
two applications, Liu stated that his first I-589 was incomplete, that he forgot to include 
certain pertinent information, and that he signed it pursuant to his attorney’s request 
without reviewing it.  When asked whether he had any witnesses who could corroborate 
his claim that he continues to practice Falun Gong in the United States, Liu said that he 
had asked witnesses to come but that they ―said it’s too much trouble‖ because they are 
―from out of state.‖  (AR 127.)    
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  Following this second hearing, the IJ again made an adverse credibility 
determination and again denied relief.  The BIA dismissed Liu’s appeal.  The Board 
found no clear error in the IJ’s credibility determination and agreed with the IJ that Liu 
failed to present reasonably available corroborative evidence in support of his claim.  
Accordingly, the BIA ordered that Liu be removed to China.    
Liu now seeks review of the BIA’s order.        
II. 
We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1).  When, as in this case, ―the BIA issues a separate opinion . . . we review the 
BIA’s disposition and look to the IJ’s ruling only insofar as the BIA defers to it.‖  Huang 
v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010).  We exercise de novo review over the 
BIA’s legal determinations.  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004).  We 
review agency factual determinations, including findings concerning credibility, under 
the substantial evidence standard, treating them as ―conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
Liu’s primary arguments on appeal concern the BIA’s determination that he failed 
to meet his burden of proof on his asylum claim.  First, Liu claims that he provided 
credible testimony in support of his claim.  Because Liu filed his asylum application after 
May 11, 2005, the provisions of the REAL ID Act governing credibility determinations 
apply.  See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  Prior to the 
implementation of the REAL ID Act, minor omissions or inconsistencies that did not go 
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to the heart of an asylum applicant’s claim were insufficient to support adverse credibility 
determinations.  See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under the 
REAL ID Act, however, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on any 
inconsistencies, without regard to whether they relate to the heart of the alien’s claim.  8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   
We have reviewed the record and conclude that substantial evidence supports the 
agency’s adverse credibility determination.  As the BIA explained, there were significant 
inconsistencies in Liu’s story.  For example, although Liu testified that he had been 
arrested and detained for over a month in January 2005, he failed to mention this 
incident—which is by far the most egregious—in his original asylum application.  
Instead, he claimed only that he had been arrested in June of that year and detained for a 
few hours.  In addition, despite Liu’s contention in his applications and before the IJ that 
police had arrested him on these occasions for practicing Falun Gong, he stated in an 
affidavit to his initial I-589 that he did not practice it, but only spoke in support of it.  
Furthermore, while he stated in his amended I-589 that his mother had been arrested, 
detained, and tortured in 1999 for practicing Falun Gong, his original application fails to 
make any mention of his mother’s alleged persecution.  Because we agree with the BIA 




                                                 
1
 Liu argues that the BIA erred in failing to find that the IJ neglected to fully 
consider the explanations he provided for the inconsistencies within and between his first 
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 Liu also challenges the BIA’s determination that he failed to present reasonably 
available corroborative evidence in support of his claim.  Corroboration may reasonably 
be expected for ―facts which are central to his or her claim and easily subject to 
verification.‖  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  We have consistently held that ―failure to produce corroborating 
evidence may undermine an applicant’s case where (1) the IJ identifies facts for which it 
is reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration, (2) the applicant fails to 
corroborate, and (3) the applicant fails to adequately explain that failure.‖  Chukwu, 484 
F.3d at 191–92.   
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Liu failed to present 
reasonably available corroborative evidence in support of his claim.  As the BIA 
explained, Liu failed to submit any evidence regarding the injuries he allegedly sustained 
during his period of incarceration in January 2005, evidence regarding the June 2005 
arrest, or any statements corroborating his continued practice of Falun Gong in the United 
States.  Although Liu argues on appeal that he gave adequate explanations as to why he 
was unable to obtain such corroboration, we agree with the agency that his explanations 
were unpersuasive.  
                                                                                                                                                             
I-589, his second I-589, and his testimony.  Based on our review of the record, however, 
it appears that the IJ sufficiently considered Liu’s explanations before reasonably 
rejecting them.  See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) 
(―Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between 
them cannot be clearly erroneous.‖)   
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Next, Liu argues for the first time on appeal that the BIA erred in failing to find 
that the IJ abused her discretion by admitting portions of the transcript of the earlier 
proceeding into evidence.  This claim is not properly before the Court because Liu failed 
to present it to the BIA.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594–95 (3d Cir. 
2003) (explaining that an alien must ―raise and exhaust his or her remedies as to each 
claim or ground for relief if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of that 
claim‖).  
 Finally, we reject Liu’s arguments that the BIA erred in concluding that he was 
not entitled to withholding of removal or relief under the CAT.  When, as in this case, 
―asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims are based on the same discredited 
testimony, the adverse credibility finding is fatal to all three claims.‖  Zine v. Mukasey, 
517 F.3d 535, 541 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
IV. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
  
 
